Planck Lessons learned Memories Issues Gratification




International Conference

CMB@60 Accademia delle Scienze di Torino 28-30 May 2025



N. Mandolesi Planck LFI PI









- > Early '70s: First Approach to CMB
- **> Late '70s: Early experiments dreaming reasonable** δ**T**/**T**
- > '70s '80s: CMB Spectrum -> Best T before COBE FIRAS

1992: Preparation to COBRAS proposal





G. Smoot Nobel Lecture 2008 CMB @ Berkeley

- Joe Silk theory 1967, start @ UCB in 1970
- Paul Richards took on graduate students John Mather & Dave Woody - beginning 1974

— Develops bolometers and Michelson Interferometer

-precursor for COBE FIRAS

- Anisotropy & Polarization beginning 1974 — Ground-based, aircraft, balloons, and spacecraft
- Berkeley-Italy spectrum collaboration joined by Haverford College - 1977

-Long Wavelength coherent receiver observations

- Develop reference loads

- Competition with head start
 - Rainer Weiss & Dirk Muehlner @ MIT
 - Dave Wilkinson @ Princeton theory & motivation Jim Peebles

Spectrum : Collaboration at White Mtn.








Berkeley – Italy – Haverford Team












Bologna White Mountain & CN results










A proposal submitted in response to ESA M3 Call for Mission Ideas (May 1993)

Then COBRAS-SAMBA and Planck

SAMBA

Satellite for Measurements of Background Anisotropies



COBRAS

COsmic Background Radiation Anisotropy Satellite






Figure 7 - The proposed geometrical disposition of the feed elements in the focal plane array is shown. The higher frequency elements (26-125 GHs) are more assailive to beam distortion effects and have been dustered near the center of the array. Our preliminary study shows that come lobes of the most decentered elements are expected to be below -40 dB (10^{-4}) at 125 GHs and below -55 dB $(10^{-5.5})$ at 30 GHs.





"high risk - world class science" mission

- Instrumentation not off the shelf
- the data processing had to be fine tuned during the overall mission and data analysis lifetime

But the H/W, the S/W and.... the science objectives have been highly successful









Many areas of Lessons Learned

- Management (development, operations, science)
- Technical (satellite, payload)
- Operational (satellite, instruments)
- Data processing
- Documentation







- 1. Managing Structure too complex: ESA project team, instrument development teams, ESA-led industry and Consortia led industry....
- 2. PI-PM meetings and Science Team: the right answer? And the day-to-day activities management?
- 3. Dedicated Working Groups: OK
- 4. Lack of continuity in PM
- 5. Funding: Problematic, no certainties of funding during the full mission PI-PM-ESA-Funding agencies useful but not enough.
- 6. Support from national Agencies: controversial/not ideal



- planck
- Schedule: too many sleeps longest launch delay among ESA missions
- 8. Instrument organizations (based on academics/postdocs) with ESA/industrial professionals): Messy
- 9. Academic/Research personnel would have needed to be trained in evaluating/managing costs/risks/schedule/changes
- 10.Consortia with hundreds of Institutes, each with different funding, manpower, schedule problems
- 11.Inflation of meetings/telecons/bottle neck of key people
- 12.Communication and Information: not ideal
- 13.Documentation: huge number of documents -> all necessary ?
- 14.Lack of first author in papers damage carriers of young people





The thermal design

- Passive cooling + three levels of active coolers
- Cooling chain: 4 K cooler non redundant, sorption cooler technology not tested sufficiently in space, V-grooves not easily accepted by industry (under ESA contract)
- Testing on the ground of in-flight conditions

The optical design

- A large and demanding telescope
- Extreme control of straylight
- Highly accurate prediction of performance requiring very demanding on-ground measurements

The instruments

- High performance (sensitivity, stability)
- Difficult test environment





planck

- Planck was a risky mission with, not only, several single-point failures
- A risk assessment with Planck's level of risks would not be ready to fly today
- The success of Planck is certainly attributed to the technical excellence of all the teams involved in the development but.....

some luck helped







Planck was conceived as a "simple" survey satellite

The most important drivers turned out (unexpectedly) to be:

- •Long and complex Commissioning and PV ops
- Contingency operations

This required more manpower and a different setup than initially planned







Understanding and control of systematic effects from many different sources was a great effort. It involved data processing at many different levels in a manual and iterative process with deep understanding of instruments It also means a lot of parallel streams of work

Removing the first level of systematics (when single effects dominate) is relatively straightforward – at the second and third levels, when several effects compete it becomes very difficult... Improvements in knowledge are exponential – not linear.

A huge amount of computing effort and a significant organization and management was required (difficult task within the non-hierarchical scientific community)






Comparison of Launch Delays



· eesa

Science Project Performance



→ THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY





Beginning





















Planck is a great success !

And we hope that we can learn from it and build even better experiments in the future...





Planck Collaboration, including individuals from more than 100 scientific institutes in Europe, the USA and Canada.



